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The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study
Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Instituut - 1999
-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides howmuch income … punishment behavior. (3) Thereare discontinuous “jumps” in the behavior of responders. They either chooseno punishment (destroy … nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroyeverything). (4) Expectations have a significant effect on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255559
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The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study
Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 1999
-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much …) Irritation and contempt drive punishment behavior. (3) There are discontinuous “jumps” in the behavior of responders. They either … choose no punishment (destroy nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroy everything). (4) Expectations have a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137100
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Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment
Offerman, Theo; Potters, Jan; Verbon, Harry A.A. - Tinbergen Institute - 1999
Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infinite overlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is also the inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144485
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Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment
Offerman, Theo; Verbon, Jan PottersHarry A.A.; Verbon, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 1999
Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infiniteoverlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as aNash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is alsothe inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257625
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Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction
Bosman, Ronald; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions andbidding behavior in a second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255774
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Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered
Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137046
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Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction
Bosman, Ronald; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2003
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions and bidding behavior in a second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137109
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition … experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631
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An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
organize data well in previous experiments meant to test other concepts. This experiment provides the first systematic test of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256353
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition … experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256700