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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556

Deliberation, Information Aggregation and Collective Decision Making

Swank, Otto H.; Wrasai, Phongthorn - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002

We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection.Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote onthe project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability thatgood decisions are made....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255757

Do Elections lead to Informed Public Decisions?

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Public Choice', 129, 435-460.<P> Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255916

Deregulating Sunday Shop Policies

Dijkgraaf, E.; Gradus, R.H.J.M. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

Sunday shop opening is deregulated to the municipal level in the Netherlands. Despite positive effects on economic growth and employment, many municipalities restrict Sunday shop opening. Based on 2003 data we show that diverse local characteristics, like the size of municipalities and religious...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255973

What to put on and what to keep off the Table? A Politician's Choice of which Issues to address

Sayag, Rei S.; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed light on this agenda setting, we develop a model in which a politician has to decide whether or not to address a public issue. Addressing an issue means that the politician investigates the issue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256020

On the Dynamics of Interest Group Formation and Endogenous Policymaking

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000

We present a dynamic model of the interaction between interest groupsand policymakers, featuringendogenous interest group formation. We show that complicated dynamicpatterns in economicpolicies may arise once interest group formation is taken intoaccount.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256184

Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation

Wrasai, Phongthorn; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization' (2007). Volume 62, pages 579-590.<P> When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256246

Deregulating Sunday Shop Policies

Dijkgraaf, E.; Gradus, R.H.J.M. - Tinbergen Institute

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209459

What Drives Donor Funding in Population Assistance Programs?

Dalen, Hendrik P. van; Reuser, Mieke - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

The 1994 International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) established goals for the expansion of population assistance. This global effort has so far not sufficiently been supported by donor funds. Dynamic panel estimation methods are used to see what lies behind the sharing of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144408

Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition

Beniers, Klaas J.; Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144528