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Advantaged Bidders in Franchise Auctions
Berg, Vincent van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
Consider a government that auctions a franchise for, e.g., an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. Consider …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256704
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Auctions for Private Congestible Infrastructures
Berg, Vincent A.C. van den - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
This paper investigates regulation by auctions of private supply of congestible infrastructures in two networks … generalised price or number of users leads to the first-best outcome. Moreover, these two auctions are robust: they attain the … structures. On the contrary, the performances (relative to the first-best) of the transfer and capacity auctions strongly depend …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257054
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Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk
Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; Vries, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136889
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Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions
Goeree, Jacob; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137025
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Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions
Goeree, Jacob; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256938
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Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk
Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; Vries, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257219
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Mean and Bold?
Witte, Kristof De; Dijkgraaf, Elbert - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
See also the article 'Mean and bold: on separating merger economies from structural efficiency gains in the drinking water sector' 2010, <I>The Journal of the Operational Research Society</I>, 61, 222-34.<P> The Dutch drinking water sector experienced two drastic changes over the last 10 years. Firstly,...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255577
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Mean and Bold?
Witte, Kristof De; Dijkgraaf, Elbert - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
The Dutch drinking water sector experienced two drastic changes over the last 10 years. Firstly, in 1997, the sector association started with a voluntary benchmarking aimed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the sector. Secondly, merger activity arose. This paper develops a tailored...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504883
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Do Firms sell forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas
Eijkel, Remco van; Moraga, J.L. - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838600
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Do Firms sell forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas
Eijkel, Remco van; Moraga, Jose Luis - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257045