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Wage Structure and the Incentive Effect of Promotions
Herpen, Marco van; Cools, Kees; Praag, Mirjam van - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144477
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Wage Structure and the Incentive Effect of Promotions
Herpen, Marco van; Cools, Kees; Praag, Mirjam van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257489
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This … article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the … applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256032
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This … article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the … applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136986
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Structural Estimation of Search Intensity: Do Non-Employed Workers Search Enough?
Gautier, Pieter A.; Moraga-González, José Luis; … - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
We present a structural framework for the evaluation of public policies intended to increase job search intensity. Most of the literature defines search intensity as a scalar that influences the arrival rate of job offers; here we treat it as the number of job applications that workers send out....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144494
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Structural Estimation of Search Intensity: Do Non-Employed Workers Search Enough?
Gautier, Pieter A.; Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
We present a structural framework for the evaluation of public policies intended to increase job search intensity. Most of the literature defines search intensity as a scalar that influences the arrival rate of job offers; here we treat it as the number of job applications that workers send out....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256974
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Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
Albrecht, James; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003
We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249546
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Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications
Gautier, Pieter A.; Moraga-González, José L. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209482
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Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
Albrecht, James; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan - Tinbergen Institute - 2003
We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504927
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Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications
Gautier, Pieter A.; Moraga, Jose L. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257112