Recent laboratory experiments support the popular view that the introduction of corporate leniency programs has significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid...

Recent laboratory experiments support the popular view that the introduction of corporate leniency programs has significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid...

An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on cartel formation, cartel stability and cartel recidivism. The program leads to lower prices for three reasons. First, non-cooperators are more persistent in their behavior which...

An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on cartel formation, cartel stability and cartel recidivism. The program leads to lower prices for three reasons. First, non-cooperators are more persistent in their behavior which...

This paper extends Hotelling's model of price competition with quadratic transportation costs from a line to graphs. We derive an algorithm to calculate firm-level demand for any given graph, conditional on prices and firm locations. These graph models of price competition may lead to spatial...

The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.

We propose a quantification of the p-p plot that assigns equal weight to all distances between the respective distributions: the surface between the p-p plot and the diagonal. This surface is labelled the Harmonic Weighted Mass (HWM) index. We introduce the diagonal-deviation (d-d) plot that...

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction...

We analyze the distribution of economic activity across space for different types of activity and different levels of aggregation. Not only is this distribution highly uneven (independently of the type of activity and level of aggregation), it is also remarkably regular regarding its size...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</I> (2013), 37(12), 2729-2754.<P> Existing models of R&D are not easily reconciled with four observable aspects of R&D: initial technologies ('ideas') need to be developed further, only a minority of initial...</p></i>