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Herding, Information Cascades and Volatility Spillovers in Futures Markets
McAleer, Michael; Radalj, Kim - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
Published in the <I>Journal of Reviews on Global Economics</I> (2013). Volume 2, pages 307-329.<P> Economists and financial analysts have begun to recognise the importance of the actions of other agents in the decision-making process. Herding is the deliberate mimicking of the decisions of other agents....</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256404
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Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning
Huang, Jia-Ping; Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
-benefit parameter. There are four main insights of our model: (1) A variety of collective adoption behaviors is determined by the … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of … adoption which ensures the new behavior to prevail. (4) Equilibria and dynamic be- havior changes as we change the underlying …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256157
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Catching Hipo's: Screening, Wages and Unemployment
Janssen, Maarten C.W. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000
In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high abilityworkers (hipo's) in situationsof unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger afirm's incentives to sorthigh and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their(high) ability in situationsof (high)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255551
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Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256036
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Information Overload in Monopsony Markets
Ficco, Stefano - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
I consider a situation in which heterogenous senders (applicants) compete in order to be selected by one receiver (employer). Productivity is private information to the senders, and the receiver processes imperfect signals (applications) to screen among applicants. The information-processing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256096
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Catching Hipo's: Screening, Wages and Unemployment
Janssen, Maarten C.W. - Tinbergen Institute - 2000
In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high ability workers (hipo's) in situations of unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger a firm's incentives to sort high and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their (high) ability in situations of (high)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209524
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Terrorist Targeting, Information, and Secret Coalitions
Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines; McCormick, Gordon; … - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513219
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Information Overload in Monopsony Markets
Ficco, Stefano - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
I consider a situation in which heterogenous senders (applicants) compete in order to be selected by one receiver (employer). Productivity is private information to the senders, and the receiver processes imperfect signals (applications) to screen among applicants. The information-processing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137222
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631
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An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC
Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2011b). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256353