Embedding the efficient bargaining model into the R. Hall (1988) approach for estimating price-cost margins shows that both imperfections in the product and labor markets generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue. This...

Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficient bargaining and monopsony), this paper relies on an extension of Hall's econometric framework for estimating simultaneously price-cost margins and scale economies. Using an unbalanced panel of...

We introduce a cost of location into Hotelling’s (1929) spatial duopoly. We derive the general conditions on the cost-of-location function under which a pure strategy price-location Nash equilibrium exists. With linear transportation cost and a suitably specified cost of location that rises...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Applied Econometrics</I>, 2013, 28(1), 1-46. 10.1002/jae.1256 Embedding the efficient bargaining model into the R. Hall (1988) approach for estimating price-cost margins shows that both imperfections in the product and labor markets...</i>

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10640-014-9862-0">Environmental and Resource Economics</A> (forthcoming).<P> We study coalition formation and the strategic timing of membership of an IEA for environmental issues in the Coalitional Bargaining Game (CBG) of Gomes 2005, Econometrica). For the general CBG, we...</p></a>

We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they...

Accepted for publication in the <I>Journal of Development Economics</I>.<P> This paper introduces the Small World model (Watts and Strogatz, Nature, 1998) into the theory of economic growth and investigates how increasing economic integration affects firm size and efficiency, norm enforcement, and...</p></i>

We develop a simple test to assess whether horizontal spillover effects from multinational to domestic firms are endogenous to the market structure generated by the entry of the same multinationals. In particular, we analyze the performance of a panel of 10,650 domestic and multinational firms...

This paper explains why consolidation acquisitions occur in waves and it predicts the differing role each firm is likely to play in the consolidation game. We propose that whether a firm assumes the role of rival consolidator, target, or passive observer depends on the position of the firm...

This paper introduces the Werden-Froeb Index (WFI) to assist in evaluating merger-specific efficiencies in horizontal mergers. The index measures the weighted average reduction in marginal costs required to restore pre-merger equilibrium prices and quantities after the (full or partial) merger...