Showing 1 - 10 of 59
We consider a hierarchical organization with two fully rational agents. The goal of the organization is that of selecting the best alternative out of several available, and agents are heterogenous in the accuracy with which they screen the alternatives. We show that, if internal communications...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255755
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255768
In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislativesystem implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the periodit takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit ofthis pre-commitment.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256018
This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a take authority is matched with two responders. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the endowment of each responder that is left after the second stage will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144451
We consider a hierarchical organization with two fully rational agents. The goal of the organization is that of selecting the best alternative out of several available, and agents are heterogenous in the accuracy with which they screen the alternatives. We show that, if internal communications...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144535
In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means of direct coordination or the enforcement of re-commitment devices such as contract laws.Credible threats of violence allow this role. In a local interaction model, an authority forms if mutually connected individuals with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136860
Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterative methods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed in the literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136985
While most papers on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137046
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137083
This paper studies the internal organizational design of political institutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature as composed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. The floor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented. The policy outcome is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137098