The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...

Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the...

This discussion has resulted in a publication in the <A HREF="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/00028280260136435&fnd=s"><I>American Economic Review</I></A>, 2002, 92(3), 625-43.<P> Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree...</p></i></a>

See the article with the same title in the 'Economic Journal' (2003), 113, 598-614.<p> The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper...</p>