Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>Experimental Economics</I> 2013, 16(1), 52-87.<P> Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent...</p></i>

The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...

Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the...

This discussion has resulted in a publication in the <A HREF="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/00028280260136435&fnd=s"><I>American Economic Review</I></A>, 2002, 92(3), 625-43.<P> Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree...</p></i></a>

See the article with the same title in the 'Economic Journal' (2003), 113, 598-614.<p> The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper...</p>