A growing body of evidence concludes that common ownership caused cooperation among firms to increase and competition to decrease. We take a closer look at four approaches used to identify these effects. We find that the effects the literature has attributed to common ownership are caused by...

The literature shows that a lender becomes reluctant to aid a distressed client after it receives insurance on its outstanding debt via a credit default swap (CDS). The onset of CDS trade thus accelerates client bankruptcy. We predict that the client firm's shareholders would respond by...

Institutional shareholders around the world increasingly use active share-voting to protect their portfolio investments and improve corporate governance. However, exercising voting rights involves costly and often arcane country-specific legal rules. This report on Sweden is one of a series...

Theories of delegated monitoring predict that when public disclosure is costly, monitoring by a large investor leads management to supply more private information to that investor, and less public disclosure to other similarly aligned investors who free-ride off the monitor. We test this...

Snapchat's initial public offering, which provided shares with no voting rights, is a culmination of the growing trend of dual-class shares. It contradicts the precept of one-share, one-vote that is essential for corporate democracy. Snapchat's action caused uproar among influential investors....

This paper studies institutional investors' incentives to be engaged shareholders. We measure incentives as the increase in an institution's cash flow (management fees) when a stockholding increases 1% in value, considering both the direct effect on assets under management and the indirect...