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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003842369
We explain the size and the existence of the mutual fund industry by generalizing the standard competitive noisy rational expectations framework with endogenous information acquisition. Since informed agents optimally choose to open mutual funds in order to sell their private information, mutual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003754836
We study the asset allocation problem of an institutional investor (LP) that invests in stocks, bonds, and private equity (PE). PE investments are risky, illiquid, and long-term. The LP repeatedly commits capital to PE funds, and this capital is gradually called and eventually distributed back...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584452
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This paper investigates how venture-backed companies are affected when others sharing the same investor suffer a negative shock. In theory, companies may be helped or hurt in this scenario. To examine the topic empirically, I estimate the impact of the collapse of the technology bubble on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625389
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We use information from product descriptions in firm 10-Ks to analyze whether product market competition influences analysts' decisions to cover firms, the accuracy and consistency of their earnings reports and their likelihood of obtaining Analyst All-Star status. We find that a firm's analyst...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574177
Snapchat's initial public offering, which provided shares with no voting rights, is a culmination of the growing trend of dual-class shares. It contradicts the precept of one-share, one-vote that is essential for corporate democracy. Snapchat's action caused uproar among influential investors....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756891
This paper studies institutional investors' incentives to be engaged shareholders. We measure incentives as the increase in an institution's cash flow (management fees) when a stockholding increases 1% in value, considering both the direct effect on assets under management and the indirect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011997532