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Folk Theorem with Communication
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248606
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Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori)
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359285
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Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359286
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Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai)
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708619
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Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman)
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708643
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The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828070
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Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828087
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Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828089
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Endogenous Monitoring
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828094