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Technical Appendix for "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms"
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248609
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Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708615
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Interconnection Negotiations between Telecommunication Networks and Universal Service Objectives
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708620
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Revenue Equivalence for Arbitrary Type Spaces
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708624
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Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708646
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Extensions on "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms"
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828082
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Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828093