The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly...

The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single- peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We char- acterize axiomatically the family of extended...

We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists...

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation...

We consider situations in which agents are not able to completely distinguish between all alternatives. Preferences respect individual objective indifferences if any two alternatives are indifferent whenever an agent cannot distinguish between them. We present necessary and sufficient conditions...

In a simple model where skills may differ among agents, we propose to giv e them an equal right to the resources, interpreted as including both the technological possibilities and the skill profile. An equal right guarantees to each agent a minimal welfare level which depends only on her...

This paper uses sequential stochastic dominance procedures to compare the joint distribution of health and income across space and time. It is the First application of which we are aware of methods to compare multidimen- sional distributions of income and health using procedures that are robust...

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to...

We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behavior when conditions to vote strategically diminish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type...