Similar Search Results

Salvador BARBER?; Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572210

Strategy Proofness, Pareto Optimality and Strictly Convex Norms.

Van Der Stel, H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by "n" individuals a compromise alternative. Here the … strictly convex norm, common to all agents. A voting scheme is strategy-proof, if voting for one's best point is an optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572221

Strategy-Proofness and Single-Plateaued Preferences.

Colom, D.B. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582664

Voting by Committees with Exit

Berga, Dolors; Gustavo Berganti?s; Jordi … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barber?Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582717

Algebraic Properties of Effectivity Functions.

Gurvich, V.A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824000

Voting Under Constraints.

Barbera, S.; Masso, J.; Neme, A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350798

STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES

BARBERA, S.; PELEG, B. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350804

VOTING BY QUOTA AND COMMITTEE.

BARBERA, S.; SONNENSCHEIN, H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350819

Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees.

Barbera, S.; Gul, F.; Stacchetti, E. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350833

Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges.

Barbera, S; Masso, J; Serizawa, S - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168441