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games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two … exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727784
We analyze a stochastic versions of the Rubinstein bargaining model with outside options available to both the proposer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572215
matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582677
The objective of this work is to study the effects of centralized, sectorial and decentralized bargaining patterns on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168435
We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836477
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three nec- essary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836479
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572155
: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572163
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572183
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572229