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Relative Wages, Costly Acquisition of Skills and Patterns of Unionisation.

Sanchez Losada, F - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

The objective of this work is to study the effects of centralized, sectorial and decentralized bargaining patterns on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168435

Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two … exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727784

Bargaining in a changing Environment.

Ponsati, C.; sakovics, J. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

We analyze a stochastic versions of the Rubinstein bargaining model with outside options available to both the proposer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572215

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines

Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582677

A Generalized Assignment Game

Ester Cami? - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823865

Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment

Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria; Klijn, Flip; Estela S?chez - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823950

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2008

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823951

Constrained School Choice

Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823987

On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles

Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2009

We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498408

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2009

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498412