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Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines

Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582677

Relative Wages, Costly Acquisition of Skills and Patterns of Unionisation.

Sanchez Losada, F - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

The objective of this work is to study the effects of centralized, sectorial and decentralized bargaining patterns on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168435

Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two … exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727784

Bargaining in a changing Environment.

Ponsati, C.; sakovics, J. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

We analyze a stochastic versions of the Rubinstein bargaining model with outside options available to both the proposer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572215

Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2011

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to suc- cessfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003959

A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'

Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2011

We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' (Roth, 1986) generalizes to many-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144867

Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2011

In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008871269

Sequencing Games without Initial Order

Klijn, Flip; Estela S?chez - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582602

Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582632

Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,''...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582634