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Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two … exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727784

Relative Wages, Costly Acquisition of Skills and Patterns of Unionisation.

Sanchez Losada, F - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

The objective of this work is to study the effects of centralized, sectorial and decentralized bargaining patterns on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168435

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines

Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582677

Bargaining in a changing Environment.

Ponsati, C.; sakovics, J. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

We analyze a stochastic versions of the Rubinstein bargaining model with outside options available to both the proposer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572215

Countervailing Power? Collusion in Markets with Decentralized Trade

Burani, Nadia; Ponsati, Clara - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247855

Employment by Lotto Revisited

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto. Second, we disprove Aldershof et al.'s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247860

A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences

Ballester, Miguel Angel; Haeringer, Guillaume - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order $L$ over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247862

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

Ruth Mart?ez; Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247863

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008592869

On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria

Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008592874