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Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two … exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727784

Bargaining in a changing Environment.

Ponsati, C.; sakovics, J. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

We analyze a stochastic versions of the Rubinstein bargaining model with outside options available to both the proposer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572215

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines

Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582677

Relative Wages, Costly Acquisition of Skills and Patterns of Unionisation.

Sanchez Losada, F - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

The objective of this work is to study the effects of centralized, sectorial and decentralized bargaining patterns on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168435

On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game

Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2013

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836477

Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability

Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2014

We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three nec- essary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836479

Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case.

Maschler, M. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572155

Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with

Jarque, Xavier; Clara Ponsat? Jozsef Sakovics - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572163

Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572183

Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2005

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572229