This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to...

Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting autocracies. We exploit the existence in many countries of executive term limits to show that electoral accountability is the key reason behind this "democratic peace" phenomenon. We construct a new...

We present a model of electoral competition in which parties act as brands and use competition to select their candidates. We show that the forces that shape the competition between party representatives and independents rationalize the positive correlation between inequality and polarization...

Standard Setting Organizations have developed FRAND agreements in order to prevent firms from holding up other participants once a standard is created. We analyze here the consequences of such agreements-in particular the requirements of fairness and non-discrimination-for the creation of...

Transfers to firms and regions are made both at the level of member states (state aids) and at the level of the European Commission (Structural Funds). State aids can take different forms: direct (transfers, tax exemptions) or indirect (e.g. the definition of the reserved area in network...