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This paper studies how children learn to bargain. We performed simple anonymous bargaining experiments with real payoffs with 256 children from age 8 to 18. On average, offers by even the youngest children were close to optimal, given the responses. Both offers and responses were similar to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763176
In this paper we examine how risk attitudes change with age. We present participants from age 5 to 64 with choices between simple gambles and the expected value of the gambles. The gambles are over both gains and losses, and vary in the probability of the non-zero payoff. Surprisingly, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763195
The most distinctive prediction of prospect theory is the fourfold pattern (FFP) of risk attitudes. People are said to be (1) risk-seeking over low-probability gains, (2) risk-averse over low-probability losses, (3) risk-averse over high-probability gains, and (4) risk-seeking over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464092
In this paper we study trust/reciprocity behavior in children ages eight to eighteen using an augmented version of Berg et al.’s (1995) trust game. This study is intended to inspect and reveal when certain aspects of trust behavior are formed in individuals. In addition, we examine the affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635108
This paper describes some simple economic experiments that can be done using children as subjects. We argue that by conducting experiments on children economists can gain insight into the origins of preferences, the development of bargaining behavior and rationality, and into the origins of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635093
We study the development of bargaining behavior in children age seven through 18, using ultimatum and dictator games. We find that bargaining behavior changes substantially with age and that most of this change appears to be related to changes in preferences for fairness, rather than bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635118
We examine rewards and punishments in a simple proposer-responder game. The proposer first makes an offer to split a fixed-sized pie. According to the 2×2 design, the responder is or is not given a costly option of increasing or decreasing the proposer's payoff. We find substantial demands for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763175