We use the two-factor, two-sector, two-country model of Melvin and Warne (1973) and Markusen (1981), in which the production of one good is monopolized in each country, in order to investigate the role of the price normalization. We illustrate several puzzling effects that occur if the price...

We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state, two periods, t=0,1, private ownership of initial endowments, a single firm, and no assets other than shares in this firm. In Dierker, Dierker, Grodal (2002), we give an example of such an economy in which all market equilibria...

We consider an economy with incomplete markets and a single ¯rm and assume that utility can be freely transferred in the form of the ini- tially available good 0 (quasilinearity). In this particularly simple and transparent framework, the objective of a firm can be defined as the max- imization...

We consider economies with incomplete markets, production, and a given distribution of initial endowments. The main purpose of the paper to present a robust example of an econmy with only one firm and one good per state in which no production dicision entails a constrained efficient outcome. In...

We consider a firm acting strategically on behalf of its shareholders. The price normalization problem arising in general equilibrium models of imperfect competition can be overcome by using the concept of real wealth maximization. This concept is based on shareholders' aggregate demand and does...

We use the two-factor, two-sector, two-country model of Melvin and Warne (1973) and Markusen (1981), in which the production of one good is monopolized in each country, in order to investigate the role of the price normalization. We illustrate several puzzling effects that occur if the price...