In Harstadś (2012) model, climate damage only hits one group of countries, called the coalition, and the coalitionś climate policy consists of capping own fuel demand and supply combined with the purchase of fossil fuel deposits for preservation. Harstadś Theorem 1 states that if the deposit...

A small open economy produces a consumer good along with green and black energy and imports fossil fuel for black-energy production at an uncertain world market price. Efficient risk management requires curbing fuel consumption, and hence carbon emissions, when consumers are prudent. Moreover,...

A small open economy produces a consumer good along with green and black energy and imports fossil fuel for black-energy production at an uncertain world market price. Efficient risk management requires curbing fuel consumption, and hence carbon emissions, when consumers are prudent. Moreover,...

In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel and deposits, some coalition of countries fights climate change by purchasing and preserving fossil fuel deposits, which would be exploited otherwise. If the coalition's policy parameters are the demand and supply of deposits...

In Harstad´s (2012) model, climate damage only hits one group of countries, called the coalition, and the coalition´s climate policy consists of capping own fuel demand and supply combined with the purchase of fossil fuel deposits for preservation. Harstad´s Theorem 1 states that if the...

In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel and deposits, some coalition of countries fights climate change by purchasing and preserving fossil fuel deposits, which would be exploited otherwise. If the coalition’s policy parameters are the demand and supply of deposits...

The basic model of the literature on self-enforcing international environmental agreements is a model of autarkic countries. We extend that model by international trade and investigate its impact on the performance of Nash coalitions and on their stability, in particular, in a general...

In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of selfenforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and...

This note investigates the suitability of unilateral consumption taxes for alleviating climate change in a two-period two-country general equilibrium model with a finite stock of fossil fuel. We analyze the incidence of a unilateral consumption tax in the first period on world carbon emissions....

Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of non-renewable fossil-fuel resources (= world carbon emissions). Following Eichner and Pethig (2011b) we set up a two-country two-period model in which one of the countries represents a...