In 2009, Germany introduced a new debt rule in its federal constitution (Grundgesetz). The socalled ‘debt brake’ prescribes a balanced budget for both the federal level and the states. However, the states have leeway regarding transposition and specification of the national requirements into...

Fiscal federalism in Germany is characterized by lacking sub-national tax autonomy and intensive fiscal equalization. Due to a sunset clause, the current equalization system has to be renegotiated by the year 2019. Against this backdrop, this contribution studies the reform preferences of...

Recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditions under which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. A system of...

This paper uses a simple model of fiscal competition between local jurisdictions to analyse the impact of intergovernmental grants on the composition of public spending. We find that a higher degree of redistribution within a system of ʺfiscal equalisationʺ coincides with a smaller overall...