R&D rivalry and optimal R&D policies are investigated in an asymmetric four-stage game that involves international licensing. It is found that a government’s R&D policy crucially depends on its domestic firm’s bargaining power over the licensing gain. When the firm’s bargaining power is...

Firms in socialist and transitional economies are often obliged to provide a social good in addition to a private good, which makes it difficult for a government to commit not to bail out the firm once it is in financial trouble. This creates a soft budget constraint syndrome which causes the...

In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market competition and union power. The model has a two-stage setting in which wages are determined through bargaining between management and unions in the first stage, with a price-setting market game to follow in the...

This paper examines the asymptotic (in)efficiency of Stackelberg markets with incomplete information. Firms who are early in the queue make their quantity choices based on limited information and their output choices are likely to deviate from those optimal under complete information. Due to the...

In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market competition and union power. The model has a two-stage in which are determined through bargening between management and unions in the first stage, with a price-setting market game to follow in the second stage....