We study tacit collusion in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and not their bids. We adopt a stringent interpretation of tacit collusion as collusion without communication about strategies that we model as a symmetry restriction on repeated game strategies:...

We study collusion in repeated first-price auctions under the condition of minimal information release by the auctioneer. In each auction a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object. Bidders do not observe other bidders’ bids, who participates or who wins in case they are not the...

Stimulus-response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) models are estimated with experimental data from sender-receiver games and compared using the Davidson and MacKinnon P-test for non-nested hypotheses. Depending on a certain adjustment parameter, the P-test favors the SR model, the BBL model...

Today, leading defense firms are concentrated into just two distinct blocs . those based in the US and those in Western Europe. All US defense firms and most European ones are private. Market structure may thus play an important role in determining procurement levels as well as defense policies...

This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee...

This paper explores how efficiency promotes the use of structure in language. It starts from the premise that one of language’s central characteristics is to provide a means for saying novel things about novel circumstances, its creativity. It is reasonable to expect that in a rich and...