We introduce a method of modelling coordination inside an organization as a process of "attribute matching." Using this method, we compare organizational forms (U-form and M-form) in coordinating changes. In our model, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and...

China's reform worked and produced one of the most impressive growth in the largest developing and transition economy in the world in the past twenty-two years. That China has managed to grow so rapidly despite the absence of many conventional institutions such as rule of law and secure private...

China's economic performance of the past two decades presents a puzzle for the economics of transition and development: Enormous private business incentives were unleashed that have fueled rapid economic growth despite the fact that China has had very weak "conventional institutions" (such as...

We present a model of bank passivity and regulatory failure. Banks with low equity positions have more incentives to be passive in liquidating bad loans. We show that they tend to hide distress from regulatory authorities and are ready to offer a higher rate of interest in order to attract...

We present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies. Law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidnce and a fiscal externality. We analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem. A first...