In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people in a corrupt country suffer from high corruption levels. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt offcials have to pay...

We study the influence of bank insolvency on corporate restructuring in a dynamic model of bank relationship. Using a poorly developed banking technology our model shows that bank insolvency can have a positive effect on firms' incentives to restructure. Due to the technology each firm faces...

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank’s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the...

Banks entering an emerging market face a lot of uncertainty about the risks involved in lending. We use a unique unbalanced panel of nearly 700 shortterm loans made to SMEs in Slovakia between January 2000 and June 2005. Of the loans granted, on average 6.0 per cent of the firms defaulted....

Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected...