We empirically measure the effects of increasing competition on equilibrium bidding in procurement auctions In common-value auctions the winner's curse counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases First we estimate the structural parameters of an equilibrium bidding...

This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers' preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001a). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not...

In this note we propose model selection criteria (MSC) for unconditional moment models using empirical likelihood (EL) statistics in the construction of the MSC The use of EL-statistics in lieu of the more common J-statistics leads to a much more transparent interpretation of the MSC by...

We develop a new estimation methodology for dynamic optimization models with unobserved state variables Our approach is semiparametric in the sense of not requiring explicit parametric assumptions to be made concerning the distribution of these unobserved state variables We propose a two-step...