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A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel

Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, Ken-ichi - 2001

payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of bargaining at random against any other player. In the kooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958

A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States

Blouin, Max; Serrano, Roberto - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420254

Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2001

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The … mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318986

Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953 - 2003

Serrano, Roberto - 2004

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318959

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2002

one seller, full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the … first period. The outcome with n sellers depends both on the structure of sellers' information and, more importantly, on the … intensity of competition among them allowed by the trading rules. With intense competition (absence of clienteles), information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890

A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2002

We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318865

Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

Kar, Anirban; Ray, Indrajit; Serrano, Roberto - 2005

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318905

Type diversity and virtual Bayesian implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2000

It is well known that a social choice function is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if it is incentive compatible. However, in general it is not possible to rule out other equilibrium outcomes, and additional conditions, e.g., Bayesian monotonicity, are needed to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318919

Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine

Artemov, Georgy; Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2007

We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation succeed in all type spaces consistent with a given payoff type space as well as with a given space of first-order beliefs about the other agents’ payoff types. This last bit, which constitutes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318934

The theory of implementation of social choice rules

Serrano, Roberto - 2003

parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the … the private information is truthfully elicited and the social optimum ends up being implemented? In designing such a … mechanism, appropriate incentives will have to be given to the agents so that they do not wish to misrepresent their information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318948