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A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel

Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, Ken-ichi - 2001

payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of bargaining at random against any other player. In the kooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958

A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States

Blouin, Max; Serrano, Roberto - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420254

Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2001

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The … mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318986

Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953 - 2003

Serrano, Roberto - 2004

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318959

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2002

one seller, full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the … first period. The outcome with n sellers depends both on the structure of sellers' information and, more importantly, on the … intensity of competition among them allowed by the trading rules. With intense competition (absence of clienteles), information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890

Rationalizable implementation of correspondences

Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2016

We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669323

Level-k mechanism design

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669325

Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies

Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - 2018

We provide nonemptiness results of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication in large quasilinear economies, where every agent's informational size is small. We offer results for both replica and more general sequences of economies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058641

The nucleolus, the kernel, and the bargaining set: An update

Iñarra García, Elena; Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, … - 2019

nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058650

A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2002

We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318865