In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M Ï N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash...

This paper analyzes how statutory entitlements to maternity or parental leave affect female entry into self-employment after childbirth. For our estimations we use comprehensive panel data for German adults born between 1944 and 1989. We find that utilization of statutory parental leave...

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Determinanten der Entscheidung, einen Sohn oder eine Tochter zum familieninternen Nachfolger zu bestimmen. Ein besonderes Augenmerk liegt dabei auf dem Geschlecht des Übergebers. Nationale wie internationale Forschungsarbeiten deuten darauf hin, dass...

This paper analyzes the impact of family firms' past and future economic viability on the incumbents' decision on the business transfer mode. Using the German IAB Establishment Panel and estimating logistic regression models we show that the decision on the business transfer mode rather depends...

This paper questions the stereotypical image of migrant-led companies as being less successful than native-led businesses. While facing similar framework conditions, migrant-led businesses are supposed to differ from native-led businesses in terms of their social capital endowment. In its...

This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests, i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is interim always more likely to win than the other...

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N Ï 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...