In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M Ï N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash...

The ratio of financial to non-financial profits in the US economy has increased sharply since the 1970s, the period that is often called the financialisation of capitalism. By developing a two-sector theoretical model the ratio of financial to non-financial profits is shown to depend positively...

Since the Great Recession of 2007-9 the financialisation of the US economy has reached a watershed characterised by stagnant financial profits, falling mortgage debt and rising public debt. The reliance of households on the formal financial system appears to have weakened for the first time in...

We contribute to the study of the conceptualization and measurement of the rate of profit of the financial and nonfinancial sectors. We assemble a new data set for the US economy to construct measures of the profit rate for each sector: the return on equity, the return on assets, and the...

This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests, i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is interim always more likely to win than the other...

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N Ï 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...