In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M Ï N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash...

The trading volume channeled through off-market crossing networks is growing. Passive matching of orders outside the primary market lowers several components of execution costs compared to regular trading. On the other hand, the risk of non-execution imposes opportunity costs, and the inherent...

We examine the volume-volatility relation using detailed data from a limit order driven equity market. Estimates of the intraday slope of the demand and supply schedules of the order book are found to capture regularities in spreads, trade size and submission strategies which are believed to be...

We show evidence of a contemporaneous relation between stock market liquidity and the business cycle. Stock market liquidity worsen when the economy is slowing down, and this effect is most pronounced for small firms. Using data for both the US and Norway, we find strong evidence that stock...

This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests, i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is interim always more likely to win than the other...

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N Ï 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...