Showing 1 - 9 of 9
In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M Ï N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012439349
in Germany praises the Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship, contrasting the Mittelstand as low-growth, low-tech and … is the antithesis to the Silicon Valley entrepreneurship model. We show that Mittelstand is more than a small and medium … the Mittelstand is an excellent example of everyday entrepreneurship and a vibrant segment of economy which is also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985030
This paper analyzes the impact of family firms' past and future economic viability on the incumbents' decision on the business transfer mode. Using the German IAB Establishment Panel and estimating logistic regression models we show that the decision on the business transfer mode rather depends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011883484
entrepreneurship literature by challenging this false equation of Mittelstand and SMEs. We investigate different approaches to analyze …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012795751
this context, research on women's entrepreneurship, however, suggests that women-led businesses may be less economically …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015066226
This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests, i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is interim always more likely to win than the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011969190
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N Ï 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012140663
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420693
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014333781