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Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes

Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich> - 2005

There is abundant evidence that many individuals violate the rationality assumptions routinely made in economics …. However, powerful evidence also indicates that violations of individual rationality do not necessarily refute the aggregate … predictions of standard economic models that assume full rationality of all agents. Thus, a key question is how the interactions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858769

Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: A Probabilistic Multi-Agent Model

Ortiz, Yves; Schüle, Martin - 2011

on the other players rationality is addressed within our multi-agent framework. We find that, if costs/payoffs act as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430083

Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations

Dal Bó, Pedro - 2002

In contrast to the existing literature on repeated games that assumes a Þxed discount factor, I study an environment in which it is more realistic to assume a ßuctuating discount factor. In a repeated oligopoly, as the interest rate changes, so too does the degree to which Þrms discount the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318903

Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall

Neyman, Abraham; Okada, Daijiro - 2005

This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time … dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266360

Risk and Rationality : Uncovering Heterogeneity in Probability Distortion

Bruhin, Adrian; Fehr-Duda, Helga; Epper, Thomas - 2009

It has long been recognized that there is considerable heterogeneity in individual risk taking behavior but little is known about the distribution of risk taking types. We present a parsimonious characterization of risk taking behavior by estimating a finite mixture regression model for three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207351

The evolution of coorporation in infinitely repeated games: Experimental evidence

Dal Bó, Pedro; Fréchette, Guillaume R. - 2007

A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318861

Corporate Governance and Industrial Relations in Poland

Federowicz, Michał - Centre for the Study of Economic and Social Change in … - 2003

The paper discusses Polish privatisation from the industrial relations point of view. Itfocuses on the role of trade unions and workers councils in the privatisation process.Two polar privatisation blueprints are identified: those aiming at competitive ‘atomistic’firms and those, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868235

The optimal level of technical copyright protection:A game-theoretic approach

Ünlü, Vural; Hess, Thomas - Institut für Wirtschaftsinformatik und Neue Medien … - 2003

Immaterial information products (“content”) can be represented in digital form, which is anadvantage but also a source of problems. It is fundamentally impossible to prevent copyingof digital data, which is just a stream of bits – ones and zeros: Once you can read it, you cancopy it. With...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868877

Nash Competive Equilibria and Two Period Fund Separation

Hens, Thorsten; Reimann, Stefan; Vogt, Bodo - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich>; … - 2004

We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. If two-fund separation is found to hold across periods for competitive behavior, it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858107

Games and Prospects

Rieger, Marc Oliver - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich> - 2006

We study how the framework of classical game theory changes when the preferences of the players are described by Prospect Theory instead of Expected Utility Theory. Specifically, we study the influence of framing effect and probability weighting on the existence and specific structure of Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858351