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Can Economics Explain Where All-Inclusive Deals are Offered?

Bladh, Christian; Holm, Håkan J. - 2012

This paper investigates why all-inclusive travel packages are offered at some hotels but not at others. By using the theory of transaction cost, it is argued that all-inclusive contracts mitigate a hold-up problem and that the severity of this problem varies with regards to the hotel's distance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208603

Estimating firms' bank-switching costs

Liaudinskas, Karolis; Grigaitçe, Kristina - 2021

We explore Lithuanian credit register data and two bank closures to provide a novel estimate of firms' bank-switching costs and a novel identification of the hold-up problem. We show that when a distressed bank's closure forced firms to switch, these firms started borrowing at lower interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012661576

Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty

Habis, Helga; Csercsik, Dávid - 2012

We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. We allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208623

Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value

Casajus, André - 2011

, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by … them are equivalent. Combined with the dummy player axiom, any of the collusion properties has strong symmetry implications …-redundantly characterized by the dummy player axiom and any of the collusion properties, provided that the player set is as above. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306844

Strategic voting over strategic proposals

Bond, Philip; Eraslan, Hülya - 2008

Prior research on 'strategic voting' has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e.,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277536

Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

Eraslan, Hülya; McLennan, Andrew - 2010

We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer's identity (and whether there is a proposer) are randomly determined; the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one; each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal; and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277543

Privatisation and renationalisation: What went wrong in Bolivia's water sector?

Hailu, Degol; Osório, Rafael Guerreiro; Tsukada, Raquel - 2009

This paper investigates the concentration of access to safe water across income levels in Bolivia. In particular, it focuses on how privatisation has changed coverage, affordability and the concentration of access to water on the part of the poor. We compare the performance of cities in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293309

Trade in Energy Services: GATS and India

Mukherjee, Arpita; Goswami, Ramneet - 2009

Energy plays a vital role in the development of any economy and given its unequal distribution trade in energy, especially fossil fuels, is an important component of international trade. In the past, due to its public good characteristics, energy-related services were mostly supplied by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011807637

On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna - 2014

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380988

A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value

Voorneveld, Mark; Grahn, Sofia - 2001

A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321738

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