Showing 1 - 10 of 143
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012373280
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282506
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282523
Cultural and institutional differences among nations may result in differences in the ratios of marginal costs of goods in autarchy and thus be the basis of specialization and comparative advantage, as long as these differences are not eliminated by trade. We provide an evolutionary model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287852
regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting regulation levels … lobbying, but that lobbying can reverse the welfare ordering. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315488
We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a … restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both … firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315572
This paper investigates if multinationals in.uence the political process through lobbying more effectively than … national firms. First, I introduce a model which contrasts a multinational's incentives for lobbying with those of a national … firm. Then the effect of lobbying on the political decision is analyzed. I conclude that multinationals have smaller …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315594
This paper addresses the effects of the revolving door phenomenon on the inequality of influence among firms. It shows that firms are not equal in their capacities to benefit from state connections. We first develop a theoretical model introducing the notion of "bureaucratic capital" and showing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057434
The paper studies the role of information transparency on fairness concerns, welfare and efficiency. When the firm's productivity and ultimately profits are revealed, wage offers induce relatively fair divisions of potential gains and workers respond with higher performance. Workers respond not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334250
procurement auction with asymmetric bidders. We adopt a constrained (piecewise linear) strategy equilibrium concept and estimate … difference between the winning firm and the most efficient bidding firm. We also compare the expected procurement costs under two … different auction formats. The data is collected from procurement auctions of road painting in Sweden during 1993-99. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321543