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Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: Experts vs. quacks
Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019
of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012140661
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Asymmetric power and market failure: Power hazard in exchange
Ertürk, Korkut Alp - 2016
In simple textbook treatment of bilateral exchange traders end up on the contract curve such that the trading surplus is maximized regardless of any asymmetric bargaining power they might have. However, that need not be true when the terms of exchange are determined by uncooperative bargaining,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011882745
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Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims
Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2008
We provide three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims that are not necessarily convex. One characterization result is obtained by using, together with other standard axioms, two solidarity axioms. Another...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280758
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Level-k mechanism design
De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669325
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Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes
De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014
We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526706
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Eliciting information from a committee
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2012
The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010368176
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Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2016
We study the bilateral trade problem put forward by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) under the assumption that agents are loss-averse, using the model developed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that the endowment effect increases the sellers information rent, and that the attachment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663168
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya - 2010
In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273671
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya - 2010
In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277535
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Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2022
The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We fill this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013164118