We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any...

The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976), according to which progressive and only progressive income taxes - in the sense of increasing average tax rates on income - ensure a reduction in income inequality. This result...

Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (forthcoming) extend the classic result of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976) - according to which average-rate progressive, and only average-rate progressive income taxes, reduce income inequality - to the case of endogenous income. There it is shown that...

The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976), according to which progressive and only progressive income taxes - in the sense of increasing average tax rates on income-ensure a reduction in income inequality. This result has...

A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium...

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked...

This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers, where a single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the set of agents assigned the object satisfy a compatibility constraint. It is shown that, on the...