This paper constructs a novel equilibrium in the chopstick auction of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games and Economic …

each round of the auction are implicitly defined (pointwise) by a system of nonlinear equations so that conditions for the … develop an econometric model thus extending the literature on structural estimation of auction models Finally an empirical … example illustrates how equilibrium learning affects bidding during the course of the auction. …

bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If …

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

-price auction. Our experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average … bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of …

) on equilibrium prices, allocative efficiency and bidding behavior in a (supply-side) uniform-price multi-unit auction …

externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our … experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …

as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may …