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Uncertainty Aversion and A Theory of Incomplete Contract
Ma, Chenghu - 2013
This paper is to provide a theoretical foundation of incomplete contract in an extensive game of multi-agent interaction. It aims to explain why rational agents may agree upon incomplete contracts even though it is costless to sign a complete one. It is argued that an incomplete contract creates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132894
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On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna - 2014
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types …. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their … "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be approximated by equal-treatment e-cores of the games themselves. Our proof …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380988
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Two-sided matching via balanced exchange: Tuition and worker exchanges
Dur, Umut Mert; Ünver, M. Utku - 2015
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440131
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Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions
Hellman, Ziv; Peretz, Ron - 2015
general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452613
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A property rights based consolidation approach
Casajus, André; Labrenz, Helfried - 2014
We suggest a full consolidation approach that takes into account the property rights structure whithin the subsidiaries, in particular, the majority requirements on restructurings. Our approach employs a property rights index based on cooperative game theory.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332840
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Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value
Casajus, André - 2011
We resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by them are equivalent. Combined with the dummy player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306844
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A core-equilibrium convergence in an economy with public goods
Allouch, Nizar - 2009
This paper deals with a core-equilibrium equivalence in an economy with public goods where preferences of consumers display warm glow effects. We demonstrate that provided that each consumer becomes satiated to other consumers provision, it holds that, for a sufficiently large economy, the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280750
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Farsighted stable sets in hotelling's location games
Shino, Junnosuke - 2008
We apply farsighted stable set to two versions of Hotelling's location games: one with linear market and another with … circular market. It is shown that there always exists a farsighted stable set in both games. In particular, the set of all … games. We provide possible interpretations of these farsighted stable sets from the viewpoint of players' bargaining power …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282833
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Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies
Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - 2008
We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions and the incentive constraints are relevant. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284034
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Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
de Clippel, Geoffroy; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - 2010
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284037