contest is unfair regardless of disclosure decisions. Under this condition, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian … equilibrium outcome of the contest with pre-play communication. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to … moderate the favorite, while the strongest type of the favorite will try to discourage the underdog - so that the contest …

-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome … favorite will try to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. Self-disclosure is optimal even though a weak …

main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian … while, similarly, the strongest type of the favorite tries to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. This …

hand. The private enforcement of property rights is seen as a substitute for public enforcement that results in a contest … in this contest. We characterize how optimality conditions for the provision of private and public goods change, how an …

How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically …

experienced a ten year long civil conflict of varying intensity. We exploit that villages affected by the conflict had the same … trend in fertility as non-affected villages prior to the onset of conflict and employ a difference-in-differences estimator …. We find that women in affected villages increased their actual and desired fertility during the conflict by 22 percent …

We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 … countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls increase the probability of conflict in onshore-rich countries …, while they decrease this probability in offshore-rich countries. We use a simple model of conflict to illustrate how these …

matched to play a reduced form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the … consequences. We show that rational players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is … relates to the social conflict literature, which examines the relationship between macro level factors such as unemployment …

We study effort provision and incentivisation in a Tullock group-contest with m Ï 2 groups that differ in size. A novel …

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is … beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since confict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals … after each conflict episode. Third, accidental conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent …