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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting
Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - 2015
ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process …. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and … recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282471
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731
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Biased forecasts to affect voting decisions? The Brexit case
Cipullo, Davide; Reslow, André - 2019
uence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012013528
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Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income, and welfare spending
Lind, Jo Thori; Rohner, Dominic - 2011
informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of …. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316941
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Can endogenously chosen institutions mitigate the free-rider problem and reduce perverse punishment?
Ertan, Arhan; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis - 2005
Previous experiments on public goods dilemmas have found that the opportunity to punish leads to higher contributions and reduces the free rider problem; however, a substantial amount of punishment is targeted on high contributors. In the experiment reported here, subjects are given the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318915
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An analysis of the Swiss vote on the use of genetically modified crops
Schläpfer, Felix - 2007
cultivation of genetically modified (GM) plants within Switzerland. The present study examines how individual voting decisions … regular voter survey undertaken after national-level voting decisions in Switzerland. Among the socioeconomic characteristics …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315609
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Prize sharing in collective contests
Nitzan, Shmuel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2010
The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed privatepublic good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335975
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Demystifying the 'metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'
Nitzan, Shmuel - 2009
In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335990
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The effect of limited search ability on the quality of competitive rent-seeking clubs
Nitzan, Shmuel; Kriesler, Kobi - 2010
A competitive rent-seeking club (CRSC) offers its members the chance of winning a prize (status, position, privilege) by being selected, typically, by a civil servant or a politician. The selector replaces in our setting the usual contest success function; instead of determining the winner on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335991
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Politicians, governed vs. non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2013
Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335998