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Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927

Mechanism design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282463

Rotten kids with bad intentions

Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - 2010

player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315514

Communication & competition

Goeree, Jacob K.; Zhang, Jingjing - 2012

Charness and Dufwenberg (American Economic Review, June 2011, 1211-1237) have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk communication raises efficiency in bilateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their finding and check its robustness by introducing competition between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316885

Trust, communication and contracts: Experimental evidence

Ben-Ner, Avner; Putterman, Louis - 2006

We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy behaviors and are eschewed by many players, (c) more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318895

Lavish returns on cheap talk: Non-binding communication in a trust experiment

Ben-Ner, Avner; Putterman, Louis; Ren, Ting - 2007

We let subjects interact with anonymous partners in trust (investment) games with and without one of two kinds of pre-play communication: numerical (tabular) only, and verbal and numerical. We find that either kind of pre-play communication increases trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318961

Gains from Sharing: Sticky Norms, Endogenous Preferences, and the Economics of Shareable Goods

Fremstad, Anders - 2014

There are often "gains from sharing" underutilized goods with others. People routinely share tools, media, gear, electronics, toys, space, and vehicles with relatives, friends, and neighbors, and the internet is opening up new opportunities to share them with strangers. Drawing on the work of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457037

Hidden persuaders: Do small gifts lubricate business negotiations?

Maréchal, Michel André; Thöni, Christian - 2016

Gift-giving customs are ubiquitous in social, political, and business life. Legal regulation and industry guidelines for gifts are often based on the assumption that large gifts have the potential to influence behavior and create conflicts of interest, but small gifts do not. However, scientific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663186

The reciprocity in dynamic employment relationships

Fahn, Matthias - 2020

(which activate the norm of reciprocity) interact over the course of an employee's career. I show that firms can benefit from … its promises. Moreover, I demonstrate that more intense competition for workers can intensify the use of reciprocity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012662694

Is altruism bad for cooperation?

Hwang, Sung-Ha; Bowles, Samuel - 2008

additive. But this need not be the case. Behavioral experiments find that if reciprocity-minded subjects feel hostility towards … embodying both reciprocity and altruism we show that unconditional altruism towards other members attenuates the punishment … punishment costs. The negative effect of altruism on cooperation and material payoffs is greater the stronger is the reciprocity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287831