This paper deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow third party sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he uses classical twopart tariffs only as potential competition...

Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring intensity. Monitoring improves credit allocation, but creates informational lock-in effects in bank-borrower relationships. In a competitive credit market, banks dissipate anticipated profit from serving locked-in borrowers...

This paper studies the microfoundations of the so-called "gold device" policy by analysing a new dataset on the Bank of England's operations in the gold market at the heyday of the classical gold standard. It explains that "gold devices" must be understood in connection to the Bank's role as...

We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking using a unique dataset covering the population of corporate borrowers in Norway. We find that a lower benchmark interest rate (interbank rates or overnight rates) induces the average bank to grant more loans to risky firms. We also...

In former studies cluster firms have hardly proven to be more resilient to shocks than non-cluster firms. Yet, there is a lack of research on how cluster firms can achieve resilience. Based on a qualitative study of firms in the Eastern German Lusatian energy cluster we found that after a shock...

This paper provides new UK evidence on the relationship between managerialincentives and firm risk using a hand-collected database of 3307 executive yearobservations (698 CEO years and 2609 other executive years). We find that therelation between pay performance sensitivity and firm risk...

The paper investigates the determinants of trade credit and its interactions with borrowing constraints and the input combination of the firm, within an incomplete contract setting in which firms use a two-input technology and collateralised credit contracts. Assuming that the supplier is better...

It is commonly believed that borrowers cannot be anonymous in unsecured credit relations because anonymity heavily reduces the scope for punishment and therefore makes credit unfeasible except for very special circumstances. However, we demonstrate that credit is generally feasible even if...

This paper considers the optimal design of dynamic research contests when the buyer can set time-dependent prizes. We derive the buyer-optimal contest and show that it entails an increasing prize schedule. Remarkably, this allows the buyer to implement a global stopping rule. In particular, the...