We investigate equilibrium debt dynamics for a firm that cannot commit to a future debt policy and is subject to a fixed restructuring cost. We formally characterize equilibria when the firm is not required to repurchase outstanding debt prior to issuing additional debt. For realistic values of...

Bonds issued in high and low interest-rate environments often list at different prices despite very similar characteristics. From a risk-neutral investor's perspective, higher current prices imply higher losses in case of default, which must be compensated, if markets are efficient. We call this...

We extend the analysis of the interbank market model of Gale and Yorulmazer (2013) by studying a larger set of trading mechanisms. A trading mechanism, which allows for randomized trading, restores efficiency. In contrast to Gale and Yorulmazer, we find that fire-sale asset prices are efficient...

We propose a tractable model of a firm's dynamic debt and equity issuance policies in the presence of asymmetric information. Because "investment-grade" firms can access debt markets, managers who observe a bad private signal can both conceal this information and shield shareholders from...

This paper develops a model of corporate investment and financing decisions thatdiffers from previous contributions by recognizing that firms face uncertainty regardingtheir future access to credit markets and may have to search for creditors when raisingdebt financing. We show that accounting...

We test whether the …´firms systematic equity risk reflects the shareholders´ incen-tives to default strategically on its debt. We use a standard real options model torelate the shareholders´strategic default behavior to frictions in the debt renegotia-tion procedure. We test its predictions...

This paper develops a quantitative framework for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk and dynamic capital structure choice. We begin by observing that when cash flows depend on current economic conditions, there will be a benefit for firms to adapt their default and...

This paper examines the implications that alternative regulatory structures may have for resolving failed banking institutions. We place our emphasis on the European Union (EU), which is both economically and financially large and has several features relating to cross-border banking in the form...

This paper examines the negative externalities that may occur when a large bank fails, describes the nature of those externalities, and explores whether they may be greater in a case involving a large cross-border banking organization. The analysis suggests that the chief negative externalities...

When the debt of firms in distress is dispersed, a restructuring agreement is difficult to reach because of free riding. We develop a repeated game in which banks come across each other frequently, allowing them to threaten a punishment in case of free riding. As the number of lending banks...