Various approaches used in Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) to model endogenously determined interactions between agents are discussed. This concerns models in which agents not only (learn how to) play some (market or other) game, but also (learn to) decide with whom to do that (or not).

Fabio Petri's Microeconomics for the Critical Mind (2021) is an impressive tour de force in the field of microeconomic theory. It manifests the author's command of cutting edge analytical tools, concepts, and theoretical approaches both in the mainstream and in the heterodox literature. The book...

The paper seeks to lay out a stock-flow-based theoretical framework that provides a foundation for a general theory of pricing. Contemporary marginalist economics is usually based on the assumption that prices are set in line with the value placed on goods by consumers. It does not take into...

This paper presents a detailed 2019 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Benin as a basis for policy analysis with a focus on agriculture, food processing and energy generation from byproducts. It is based on official statistics collected from national and international institutions (national...

Prior research on 'strategic voting' has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e.,...

We analyse the all-pay auction with incomplete information and variance-averse bidders. We characterise the symmetric equilibrium for general distributions of valuations and any number of bidders. Variance aversion is a sufficient assumption to predict that high-valuation bidders increase their...

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

We develop the idea of using mean-variance preferences for the analysis of the first-price, all-pay auction. On the bidding side, we characterise the optimal strategy in symmetric all-pay auctions under mean-variance preferences for general distributions of valuations and any number of bidders....

We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer's identity (and whether there is a proposer) are randomly determined; the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one; each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal; and...

We develop a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to be determinate in a class of forward-looking Markov-switching rational expectations models, and we develop an algorithm to check these conditions in practice. We use three examples, based on the new Keynesian model of...