Showing 1 - 10 of 215
Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284074
structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284048
The Turkish macroeconomic experience since 2002 has been characterized by three striking trends: (1) an accelerated growth rate of income, (2) a sharp decline in the real interest rate, and (3) a sustained fall in the saving rate of different age-groups. During the same period, there has also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060206
Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440122
A party can address only a limited number of issues when in power. What issues to address - the party's agenda - has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent in each period addresses one issue among several...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440125
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440131
In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208437
A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208452
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208561
each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules … manipulation is equalized among all agents. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208606