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Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However …, inducing them to resist entering into employment contracts. This resistance to employment contracts vanishes if fairness … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration - the abuse of authority - and by providing an empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316905
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Let's Talk It Over: Communication and Coordination in Teams
Dietrichson, Jens; Gudmundsson, Jens; Jochem, Torsten - 2018
Collaboration in teams in which each member's output is critical to the overall success present organizations with difficult coordination problems. We develop a model and run simulations to analyze how costly communication affects team coordination and output efficiency. We show that absent any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208672
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Can Economics Explain Where All-Inclusive Deals are Offered?
Bladh, Christian; Holm, Håkan J. - 2012
theory of transaction cost, it is argued that all-inclusive contracts mitigate a hold-up problem and that the severity of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208603
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Informal incentives, labor supply, and the effect of immigration on wages
Fahn, Matthias; Murooka, Takeshi - 2021
This paper theoretically investigates how an increase in the supply of homogenous workers can raise wages, generating new insights on potential drivers for the observed non-negative wage effects of immigration. We develop a model of a labor market with frictions in which firms can motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012662721
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Cournot competition between teams: an experimental study
Schipper, Burkhard C.; Raab, Philippe - 2007
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276634
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The intrinsic value of decision rights
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger - 2014
Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long argued that certain decision rights carry not only instrumental value but may also be valuable for their own sake. The ideas of autonomy, freedom, and liberty derive their intuitive appeal-at least partly-from an assumed positive intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282466
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The intrinsic value of decision rights
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger - 2013
Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long argued that certain decision rights carry not only instrumental value but may also be valuable for their own sake. The ideas of autonomy, freedom, and liberty derive their intuitive appeal - at least partly - from an assumed positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316882
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Handing out guns at a knife fight: Behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282506
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: An empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282523
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Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2020
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012373280