Sustainability has been largely replaced by discounted utilitarianism in contemporary climate-change economics. Our approach rejuvenates sustainability by expanding the conception of the quality of life, along the lines of the UN Human Development Reports, to include not only consumption, but...

The mismatch between actions to combat climate change, which are based on voluntary national initiatives of limited effort, and the recognition of the importance of global warming is growing. Climate engineering via solar radiation management has been proposed as a possible complement to...

Die wirtschaftspolitischen Implikationen der Klimaanpassung sind entscheidend für die Ausgestaltung einer eigenständigen Klimaanpassungspolitik und geben gleichzeitig wichtige Anreize zu politischem Handeln. Dieses Papier diskutiert daher eine mögliche wirtschaftspolitische Ausrichtung der...

Klimaanpassungspolitik wird in Deutschland auf verschiedenen politischen Ebenen betrieben. Dieses Papier untersucht auf Grundlage der ökonomischen Theorie der Anpassungspolitik Defizite dieser Politikansätze. Diese liegen in erster Linie in den folgenden Bereichen: unklare Abgrenzung von...

This paper explains the emergence of the "pledge and review" governance approach found in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, in place of the "obligatory targets and timetables" approach found in the Kyoto Protocol, from a neo-Gramscian perspective. The main argument is that the adoption of...

Weather experts around the world are foreseeing a strong El Niño in 2014. In India, these developments are feared to lead to droughts. In the last 14 years, out of the four El Niño years globally, three resulted in Indian droughts. Since the 1980s, all the six droughts faced by India were in...

This paper extends theory and experimentation in the context of two parties in a group who contribute to a public good with a provision point. This study analyzes the voluntary contributions game in which a public good is provided if and only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds a...

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a...

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...