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Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!

Hu, Yingyao; Kayaba, Yutaka; Shum, Matt - 2010

How do people learn? We assess, in a distribution-free manner, subjects' learning and choice rules in dynamic two …-armed bandit (probabilistic reversal learning) experiments. To aid in identification and estimation, we use auxiliary measures of … subjects' beliefs, in the form of their eye-movements during the experiment. Our estimated choice probabilities and learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277527

On statistical methods for labor market evaluation under interference between units

Karlsson, Maria; Lundin, Mathias - 2016

Evaluation studies aim to provide answers to important questions like: How does this program or policy intervention affect the outcome variables of interest? In order to answer such questions, using the traditional statistical evaluation (or causal inference) methods, some conditions must be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695407

The Persistent Effects of Short-Term Peer Groups in Higher Education

Thiemann, Petra - 2018

This paper studies the persistent effects of short-term peer exposure in a college setting. I exploit the random assignment of undergraduates to peer groups during a mandatory orientation week and follow the students until graduation. High levels of peer ability in a group harm the students'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208832

Does competition enhance performance or cheating? A laboratory experiment

Schwieren, Christiane; Weichselbaumer, Doris - 2008

In this paper we experimentally test whether competing for a desired reward does not only affect individuals' performance, but also their tendency to cheat. Recent doping scandals in sports as well as forgery and plagiarism scandals in academia have been partially explained by "competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294922

A model of tournament incentives with corruption

Wang, Bin; Zheng, Yu - 2018

a tournament, to address how a low-powered pay scale can effectively elicit effort in a tournament infested with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012144213

Overconfidence and gender gaps in career outcomes: Insights from a promotion signaling model

Bastani, Spencer; Giebe, Thomas; Gürtler, Oliver - 2024

also contributes to human capital accumulation through learning-by-doing, leading to higher productivity. However …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015165957

Strategic outsourcing revisited

Buehler, Stefan; Haucap, Justus - 2003

This paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315541

All-pay auctions: Implementation and optimality

Jönsson, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - 2013

This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316920

Observable implications of nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

Ray, Indrajit; Snyder, Susan - 2003

In this paper we develop tests for whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium behavior when preferences are unobserved. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318885

Pay for percentile

Barlevy, Gadi; Neal, Derek - 2009

optimal levels of effort to all students. Because this scheme employs only ordinal information, our scheme allows education …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292092