We study the effects of different information structures (full information, supply uncertainty and demand uncertainty) on equilibrium prices, allocative efficiency and bidding behavior in a (supply-side) uniform-price multi-unit auction, using supply function competition and a novel experimental...

The regulated price mechanism in China’s power industry has attracted much criticism because of its incapability to optimize the allocation of resources. To build an “open, orderly, competitive and complete” power market system, the Chinese government launched an unprecedented...

Electricity from renewable sources often cannot be generated when and where it is needed. To deal with these temporal and spatial discrepancies, one frequently proposed approach is to expand storage capacities and transmission grids. It is often argued that the two technologies substitute each...

For decarbonization purposes, variable renewable energies (VRE) are widely and quickly deployed in historically fossil-dominated power systems. Yet, some fossil technologies are more suitable than others for integration with VRE due to their higher exibility. I utilize an analytically tractable...

Producers submit committed supply functions to a procurement auction, e.g. an electricity auction, before the uncertain demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium(SFE), every firm chooses the bid maximizing his expected profit given the bids of the competitors. In case of...

Most balaning markets of electric power are organized as uniform-price auctions. In 2001, the balancing market of England and Wales switched to a pay-as-bid auction with the intention of reducing wholesale electricity prices. Numerical simultations of an electricity auction model have indicated...

In a real-time electric power auction, the bids of producers consist of committed supply as a function of price. The bids are submitted under uncertainty, before the demand by the Independent System Operator has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer chooses the...

This paper derives a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) of a pay-as-bid auction, also called discriminatory auction. Such an auction is used in the balancing market for electric power in Britain. For some probability distributions of demand a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. If demand...

Consider a market where producers submit supply functions to a procurement auction - e.g. an electric power auction - under uncertainty, before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every firm commits to the supply function maximizing his expected profit given the...

The literature shows that for most UK industries privatization might be necessary but is not sufficient to produce economic benefits. Often prior changes in management or later changes in market structure and regulation have larger impacts than privatization itself. We ask what changes around...